Some oral informants deny Talha's dealing with, and the assistance he sought and sometimes received from, external elements. Others, while admitting the existence of such contact, do not provide reliable and detailed information on this important aspect of Shaykh Talha's career (76). However some written sources throw considerable light on the subject.

Because Talha's home district of Argobba and his base in Garfa were geographically contiguous to Awsa, it is natural that Talha should turn to the hereditary ruler of Awsa at the time, Sultan Anfari, for sympathy and material assistance for the prosecutions of his armed struggle. According to an oral source, Talha received from Anfari a total of 500 muskets (77). This appears to be a clearly exaggerated figure. The only recorded assistance that Talha obtained from the sultan included 2, 000 thalers, 20 guns, and a large herd of cattle, for the part played in the episode of 1885 (78).

A report by Khaifa Abdallahi's emissary to Menilek suggests an alliance between Khalifa and Anfari, and the establishment of a friendly relationship between the latter and "Esh Sheikh Tolha El Jabarti." The emissary added that Talha found it difficult to maintain his relationship with Anfari after the Sultan's dealings with the Italians (79).

The man who played an important role in the establishment of a close relationship between Anfari and Talha was 'Abd al_Rahman b. Yusuf, an Adal from Tajura (80), a supplier of arms to Anfari (81), and the Italian agent in the court of Anfari (82).

It seems that the Anfari-Talha alliance did not survive long partly because Anfari's assistance to Talha was either not forthcoming or insufficient after 1886. Therefore, Talha travelled to Walqayet from where established contact and friendly relations with the Khalifa (83). Unfortunately, there is no information to date on how and why he moved to Walqayet. Nonetheless his sojourn there marked the beginning of a close relationship with the Meahdists which lasted until 1889.

The Christian writer, Asme, suggests that the Muslim uprising in Wallo were inspired by the Mahdists: he even calls Talha a "Darbus"(84). Such a view overlooks the underlying causes of the Muslim revolts in Wallo from 1884 to 1885 (85), which predate the outbreak of the Mahdiyya itself.

It is quite possible that Shaykh Talha, after establishing himself in Walqayet, had send his own envoys to Omdurman (86), or had gone there himself, to conclude a loose alliance with the Khalifa expecting some assistance in return. Nevertheless, the period from 1886 to 1889 is rather obscure. Although various sources mention that Talha had taken part in the sacking of Gondar by the Mahdist forces on 23 January 1888 (88), and in the subsequent battle at Matamma on 7 March 1889 (89), they do not provide any details on his role in the course of the actual fighting. It is known that Abu 'Anja took some Ethiopian Muslims with him to Omdurman so that they would submit to the Mahdiyya (90), but there is no indication in our sources that Shaykh Talha was one of them.

According to some writers, Talha's relations with the Mahdists deteriorated because he was dissatisfied with the "maladministration" of the Mahdists (91). A more plausible explanation for the strained relations could be that the Mahdists had failed to assist Talha with arms. Whatever the real reason for Talha's decision to abandon them might have been, he returned to Garfa in 1889 and declared a major revolt on his own. It was in order to suppress this revolt that Empres Taytu (1851-1918) sent a force led by a certain Qannazmach (qegn-Azmach) Brelle in February 1889 while Emperor Menilek was in Tegray (93). The force was equipped with 700 muskets. However, most of the sources are silent on the outcome of the expedition. Fakadu says that Talha was defeated in Garfa and fled to Awsa (93). But the fact that Yohannes and Menilek spent the Easter of 1890 in Adame, Qallu suggests that their presence was needed to quell the revolt.

Talha's contacts with the Italians were the consequence of the initiative of the Italian agent and part of their general political strategy to exploit local Muslim dissidence in order to undermine Menilek's capacity in meeting the challenge of Italian expansion. Thus Captain Persico and his successor, Giannini were sent to make contact with Anfari, Talha and Ras Mika'el in 1894 (95). In September 1895 Talha met the two Italian agents at "Teru on the Gollima River"and according to their own report, he swore allegiance to Italy"("giuro dedelta all'Italia") (96). The Italians also counted on his hostility towards the Mahdists following his rupture with them after 1889 (97). As an inducement he received substantial military assistance in order to instigate an anti-Menilek and a pro-Italian rising among the Rayya and Azabo, and other communities of the lowlands. Talha was also instructed to occupy Ashange for the Italians before the army under Menilek reached the area (98). This was the prelude to the Battle of Amba Alage of 7 December 1895.

Shaykh Talha was supposed to deploy his force of 300-350 men armed with rifles, although, according to Berkeley, the Italians had expected him to mobilize 800 men (99). But Shaykh Talha apparently defected at the outbreak of the fighting (100). Italian sources explain his defection in terms which imply cowardice (101), while Berkeley wrote that Talha's contingent was put to flight by Ras Alula (102).

The defection of Shaykh Talha is important in two ways: firstly, it shows that whatever legitimate grievances he might have had against Menilek, Talha abandoned the Italians at the crucial moment, and, secondly his defection contributed to the disillusionment of the Italians who tried and partially succeeded in exploiting internal contradictions among Ethiopians to fulfil their own political ambitions (103). More importantly, it boosted the morale of the Ethiopians by spreading the news of the Italian disaster at Amba Alage (104). Shaykh Talha's defection also reveals that naiveté of the Europeans of the nineteenth century in assuming that their African allies would always abide by their agreements regardless of their own interest and priorities. Shaykh Talha withdrew form the military confrontation for his own specific reasons.

After his crushing victory over the Italians at Adwa in 1896, Menilek sent and expedition to Ifat against the force of Shaykh Talha who was apparently still at the head of and armed rebellion in the area. Realizing the futility of resisting the large and well-equipped imperial forces, Shaykh Talha consulted his followers who proposed a speedy retreat to the lowlands. However, in order to delude Menilek's troops into thinking that Talha possessed a large army, he came up with a strategy to minimize his losses through an untimely confrontation. He ordered each of his warriors to make a fire at ten different places all around his camp. When Menilek's troops saw from a distance the large fire in Talha's camp, they believed that he was indeed accompanied by a formidable force, and postponed attacking him overnight. When they approached the camp the following day, they found to their dismay only the ashes of burnt-out sticks of firewood scattered all over the camp (105). This episode effectively marked the end of the militant phase in Talha's turbulent life as a warrior.

The Final Phase in Talha's Career

The reconciliation between Menilek and Talha was arranged by Shaykh Nureyye Umar of Yajju who is believed to have successfully treated Menilek for some illness (106). The Emperor asked Shaykh Nureyye how he could reward him whereupon the Shaykh replied that he would feel more that sufficiently compensated if Menilek pardoned Shaykh Talha. Accordingly, a formal ceremony of reconciliation took place in the imperial court. My respectable informant, the late al-Haji Muhammad Thani Habib Bashir (1914 - 1989), told me in the summer of 1988 that he had seen a copy of Menilek's sealed letter (in the possession of one of Talha's relatives) to Shaykh Nureyye thanking him for arranging the reconciliation with Talha. Talha subsequently received land in Rasa, Ifat (107). The two events took place in 1896/97 (108).

Oral evidence has not helpful in establishing the duration of Talha's stay in Ifat following this event. However, Conti Rossini - who is our only source on this important period of Talha's life - provides a number of facts and episodes but, regrettably, few explanations, which would enable us to determine how long and in what capacity Talha spent his last years, especially in Hararge. Conti Rossini says that after his reconciliation with Menilek, Talha was entrusted to the care of Azzaz Walda Sadeq, governor of the neighbouring district of Ankobar, from whom he received a fief in Canno which he retained until after the death of Menilek (109). Therefore, Talha must have stayed in Ifat from 1896 to 1914. Zewde's statement that Talha "… was an active proponent of Islam in Wallo up to 1916"(110) makes his stay longer by two years. An informant says that while in Ifat, Talha had his land cultivated the product of which he distributed among the needy (111).

According to Conti Rossini, Talha acted as one of Menilek's intermediaries in his contacts with the Dervishes directed against the Italians and the English (112). This entirely new role of Shaykh Talha, of which informants are unaware, is rather too early after the reconciliation, as Conti Rossini himself noted (113). Could it be that Talha was a member of one of the several missions which Menilek sent to Omdurman after the Battle of Adwa, to which Holt makes a clear reference? (114)

As Shaykh Talha grew older, he felt more than ever before the need to settle down after nearly two decade of hectic life as a dissident. Why did he prefer to settle in Cärcär [Chercher]? One reason was already suggested above by informants: while in Wallo, he had become a popular figure and an object of veneration. He resented this since it conflicted with his strict adherence to orthodoxy (115). An informant said that Talha moved to Cärcär [Chercher] because of the presence of a large Muslim community among whom he could work and live (116). Another and more plausible reason have had to do with his appointment as governor of Wäddéssa.

Conti Rossini wrote that in the time of Iyyassu, with whom Shaykh Talha was on good terms (117), he was appointed governor of Wäddéssa in Carcar, was later summoned to Harar and send by Iyyassu to Somalia to launch propaganda work against Europeans (118), possibly to renew the relationship with the Somali reformer, Muhammd 'Abdille Hasen (1864 - 1920) which "… reached its climax under lij Iyasu ..." (119) Iyyasu's dynamism and sympathy for Islam in order to bring about the integration of the Muslim elements into the Ethiopian Empire must have appealed to Shaykh Talha and provided him with a further opportunity for working for the cause of Islam. This probably explains, more than any thing else, his more to Cärcär [Chercher].

Informants say that in Cärcär [Chercher], Shaykh Talha also led a quiet life of meditation and teaching - although this conflicts with the available written material which, as noted above, clearly suggested an active and eventful life.

After the fall of Iyyassu in 1916, Talha was arrested and detained for a number of years (120). He later regained his freedom and was reinstated as governor of Wäddéssa where he spent his last years and suffered from the effect of old age and poor health (121).

The exact year of his death is controversial. According to one oral informant, Talha died in 1354 A.H./1935 (122), while others say he died in 1355 JA.H./1936, just before the Italian invasion (123). He was buried at a place called Goro in Cärcär (124).

Shaykh Talha was survived by a number of sons and daughters.

Back | Next